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  Less than twenty years ago, a prominent historian remarked on the lack of scholarly 
attention to the U.S. Right.  He attributed the situation to a “problem of historical imagination” 
stemming from an assumption that progressive, secular modernism undergirded U.S. political 
life.2 Reactionary, right-wing, and religious-based conservative politics were not only 
marginalized by scholars; they were inexplicable within dominant paradigms of inquiry.  The 
problem of historical imagination that he described was even more severe for women’s 
participation in the U.S. right.  Assumptions about rightist politics made the women who 
participated in such efforts doubly marginal, as rightists and as women.  They were simply 
invisible to scholars, a situation that Sonya O. Rose argues was widespread in the historical 
imagination,  
 
Women had been neglected as historical subjects because historians viewed 
history to be almost singularly about the exercise and transmission of power in the 
realms of politics and economics, arenas in which the actors were men.3 
 
 In the intervening decades, much has changed.  There is now a substantial scholarship on 
the right in the U.S., as well as a number of studies of women’s role and gender issues in rightist 
                                                            
2  Alan Brinkley, ‘The Problem of American Conservatism’, American Historical Review, 99:2 
(1994), pp. 409-429.  Brinkley’s assessment of the paucity of such scholarship was disputed by 
Leo P. Ribuffo in ‘Why is There So Much Conservatism in the United States and Why Do So 
Few Historians Know Anything About It?’,  American Historical Review, 99:2 (1994), pp. 438-
449. 
3 Sonya O. Rose, What is Gender History? (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), p.4. 
 movements of many sorts.4  Yet, despite this accumulation of research, we are far from 
understanding how and to what extent gender matters in the U.S. right.  This article seeks to 
explain why it is difficult to understand how gender matters in the right, and suggest an analytic 
agenda for scholars who seek to do so.   
                                                            
4  There are excellent recent studies of women’s involvement in a variety of rightist movements 
in U.S., including the anti–women’s suffrage movement, antiradicalism during the 1920s Red 
Scare, efforts to stop U.S. entry into World War II, the anti– New Deal movement, and the New 
Right and New Christian Right of the 1970s to the present.  These include June M. Benowitz, 
Days of Discontent: American Women and Right-Wing Politics, 1933-1945 (Dekalb, IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2002); Susan E. Marshall, Splintered Sisterhood: Gender and 
Class in the Campaign Against Woman Suffrage (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1997); Kim E. Nielsen, Un-American Womanhood: Antiradicalism, Antifeminism, and the First 
Red Scare. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001); Ronnee Schreiber, Righting 
Feminism: Conservative Women and American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008) and Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  A recent review of sociological research on the right in 
the U.S. is Kathleen M. Blee and Kimberly A. Creasap, ‘Conservative and Right-Wing 
Movements’, Annual Review of Sociology 36 (2010), pp. 269-286. 
 
  The premise of this article is that a series of conceptual templates have circumscribed 
scholarship on gender and women in the U. S. right and continue to do so today. 5  Not all these 
templates are explicitly about women or gender, but each has shaped how women and gender 
issues are studied within the U.S. right.  Similar to how Harriet Zuckerman describes the 
research process in science, in which “scientists define some problems as pertinent, and others as 
uninteresting or even illegitimate, primarily on the basis of theoretical commitments and other 
assumption structures,” scholars of the right are steered toward some questions and not others by 
these conceptual templates. 6  
I begin by presenting two templates that earlier made it difficult for scholars to see 
women as significant rightist actors or gender issues as central in the U.S. right.  These are the 
template of the rightist as male and the template of Nazi Germany as the prototype of far-right.  I 
then consider three templates that underlie current studies of rightist politics in the U.S.  These 
are the template of historical continuity, the template of belief-driven activism, and the template 
                                                            
5  Wanda J. Orlikowski, ‘Material Knowing: The Scaffolding of Human Knowledgeability”, 
(Unpublished paper, downloaded October 19, 2010, 
http://seeit.mit.edu/Publications/Orlikowski_OKLC_write-up_2006.pdf).  Excellent discussions 
of how conceptual templates shape the questions that scholars ask are found in Judith Lorber, 
‘Shifting Paradigms and Challenging Categories’, Social Problems 53:4 (2006), pp. 448-453 and 
Joan W. Scott, ‘AHR Forum: Unanswered Questions’, American Historical Review 113:5 (2008), 
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6  Harriet Zuckerman, ‘Theory Choice and Problem Choice in Science’, Sociological Inquiry 
48:3/4 (1978), p. 74. 
 
 
 of gender as a category of analysis.  These latter templates have not precluded the study of 
women and gender on the right, but they have led to problems of focus and interpretation.  To 
illustrate the limitations imposed by these templates, I draw examples from my studies of two 
major U.S. movements of the right, the 1920s Ku Klux Klan and modern organized racism.  
These racist movements were widely separated in time but both enlisted a gender-diverse 
membership and sought similar goals of white supremacism.  Each targeted Jews and African 
Americans, yet they differed in other aspects of their ideology and political strategy.  The U.S. 
did not have substantial fascist movements like those in Europe, Latin American, and Asia, so 
racist movements are its most prominent manifestation of extreme-right politics.7   
The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) of the 1920s was a massive racist movement.  Unlike the first 
KKK of the Reconstruction-era rural South or subsequent Klans from the 1950s and after, the 
1920s KKK took deep root in the states of the U.S. North and in urban areas.  This second Klan 
attracted an estimated 3-5 million recruits, who constituted a staggering proportion of the white, 
native-born, Protestant population that was eligible for membership.   Even those who didn’t 
officially join the Klan often supported its efforts, cheering its vast parades down the main streets 
of cities and towns and electing its candidates to state and local office.  Klan chapters across the 
country had some autonomy to define their enemies and strategies.  Although all 1920s Klans 
saw African Americans, Jews, and Catholics as their enemies, local Klans also targeted 
regionally-specific enemies, including labor radicals and Mormons.   Perhaps most striking, the 
                                                            
7 Martin Durham, The Christian Right: The Far Right and the Boundaries of American 
Conservatism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).	  
 
 second Klan differentiated itself from the earlier and later Klans by actively recruiting women.  
These efforts were so successful that by the mid-1920s, women accounted for at least a half-
million of the Klan’s members.  Klanswomen were organized into a variety of Women’s Klans 
with their own hierarchies, rituals, and goals.  Some cooperated with the male KKK but others 
were very distinct and even hostile to chapters of the men’s Klan.8   
My study of the 1920s Klan was primarily archival, focused on reconstructing the history 
of the national Women’s Klan organizations as well as the experience of local Klanswomen and 
Klanswomen’s chapters in Indiana, a state with large, influential, and active Women’s and Men’s 
Klans.  In addition, I conducted a number of interviews with former Klanswomen in Indiana.  
Although quite elderly by the time they were interviewed, these women were able to provide 
important recollections about their experience in the Klan that are not available in the documents 
that survive.  Almost all, for example, recounted their time in the Klan in positive terms and were 
anxious to convince me that being in the Klan was not a particularly extraordinary period in their 
lives. 
 Modern organized racism consists of a variety of overlapping and often antagonistic 
groups of neo-Nazis, white power skinheads, Ku Klux Klans, and assorted white supremacists.  
Some are highly organized groups; others are little more than loosely networked and tiny racist 
cells or ‘lone wolf’ practitioners of racial violence.  Since the 1980s, most racist groups have 
avidly recruited women, resulting in a substantial cadre of women who are deeply committed to 
                                                            
8 Kathleen M. Blee, Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1991) and Rory McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-
Wing Politics and National Politics (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). 
 
 the principles of Aryan and white supremacism.  Many members of organized racism today also 
embrace a virulent form of anti-Semitism, regarding Jews as the literal descendants of Satan who 
need to be annihilated.  Modern racists simultaneously fear and desire to advance an apocalyptic 
race war and many support tactics and ideologies of violence and terrorism to further the politics 
of pan-Aryan supremacy.9   
 My study of modern organized racism focused on the recent incorporation of large 
proportions of women into racist groups, an effort that partly reflects the desire of male racist 
leaders to have members who they view as less likely to attract police attention.  I conducted 
extensive life history interviews with a sample of women racist activists who were chosen to 
represent a variety of types of groups, ages, position in the group, and region of the country.  In 
these interviews, I questioned racist women about the process whereby they learned about 
organized racism and decided to join, as well as their experiences in the racist movement.  I also 
conducted supplementary interviews with several female and male racist activists to address 
questions that emerged after the conclusion of the original study.  These include the effects of 
increased federal surveillance of the racist movement and the shift toward a structure of small 
racist cells on women’s participation and experience in organized racism. 
 
 
Earlier Templates   
                                                            
9 Kathleen M. Blee, Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2002); Martin Durham, White Rage: The Extreme Right and 
American Politics (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 2007); and Leonard Zeskind, Blood and 
Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream 
(New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).  
  
The Rightist as Male 
 
When studies of women on the political right began to emerge in the mid-1970s as part of 
a burgeoning feminist scholarship, 10 they often were heralded as scholarly discoveries that 
unearthed new facts about women’s involvement in the far right.  But, for the most part these 
early feminist scholars did not ‘discover’ that women had participated in rightist politics in Nazi 
Germany, fascist Italy, the U.S. New Right, and elsewhere.  The ‘fact’ of women’s involvement 
was not found in a hitherto-unexplored archival collection or through a previously inaccessible 
racist group.  Rather, such facts lay in plain sight, invisible only because they weren’t ‘seen’ as 
meaningful and significant through templates of scholarly inquiry that marked right-wing politics 
as the exclusive province of men.  Only through a feminist conceptual lens, in which women 
were central subjects of inquiry, were rightist women made visible. 
The 1920s KKK is a case in point.  Women’s involvement in this Klan had been 
mentioned in many earlier histories of the Klan.  Yet, these works treated Klanswomen as simply 
auxiliary participants, not political actors in their own right.  Since women were not considered 
                                                            
10	  Early studies include Jill Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society (New York:  Barnes & Noble, 
1975); Rebecca E. Klatch, Women of the New Right (Philadelphia, PA:  Temple University Press, 
1987); Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics (New 
York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1988); and Victoria de Grazia, How Fascism Ruled Italy, 1922-
1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). 	  
	  
 
 worthy of substantial scholarly inquiry, the questions that guided scholarship on the participants 
in the 1920s Klan were almost exclusively framed in terms of men:  Did they hold lower or 
middle class occupations?  Did they view the Klan as similar to other male fraternities?  How did 
Klansmen practice violence against those they saw as their enemies?   
Not only the participation of women, but also the existence of women-only Klan groups 
that contended for power and money with their male counterparts had earlier been documented 
by historians.  But the template that real Klan activists were male made it difficult to ask 
questions about how women organized racial and religious bigotry in these women’s Klans.  It 
undercut the possibility of knowing whether Klanswomen created a politics of hatred in ways 
differently than did Klansmen. 
 
 
Nazi Germany as the Prototype of Rightist Politics 
 
 Early studies of racist women in the U.S. took place against a second conceptual 
template, that the prototypical form of organized racism was WWII-era German Nazism.  
Although not specifically about gender, this template also shaped how women and gender were 
approached in scholarship on the U.S. right.  Three implications of the Nazi Germany template 
were influential in this regard.  First, that right-wing extremism grows in an explosive and 
exponential fashion, as did the Nazi movement in prewar Germany.  Second, that far right 
movements are the product of macro-level and structural crises, especially economic strain or 
national defeat.  Third, that the extreme right gains ascendancy when its authoritarian goals fit 
the psycho-social structure of the population, as it did in pre-war Germany’s rigid and 
hierarchical family, parenting, and personality styles.    
  The template of the German Nazi experience as prototypical undercut scholarship on 
women and gender in the U.S. right because it measured the significance of rightist politics by 
size.  As numerical minorities in racist movements like the 1920s Klan, women were assumed to 
matter proportionately less; in fact, not at all.   Moreover, the propositions that right-wing 
extremism results from psycho-social factors such as authoritarianism and structural crises like 
economic collapse or national defeat seemed to underscore its masculinist character: the far-right 
attracts men who are worried about their eroding power in the family or in the economy and 
polity.  But, these factors made the participation of women on the far right incomprehensible.  
White men – who were privileged in economic life, public politics, and the family – had a clear 
interest in racist appeals to traditionalism, economic stability, and national resurgence.  That 
these men’s anger and fear would lead them into the right was understandable, if unfortunate.  It 
was rational and self-interested.  Why so many women found right-wing politics appealing in 
some eras, however, could not be explained.  Gender wasn’t peripheral to the right in this 
explanation; indeed, it was paramount.   Rightist mobilization was explained by gender, although 
implicitly.  That gender was assumed by the template meant that it did not need to be 
investigated. 
 
Challenges to Earlier Templates 
Over the past two decades, the work of feminist scholars disrupted the earlier templates 
of studying the Right.  The template of the rightist as male could not be sustained as scholars 
documented women’s participation in a variety of fascist, racist, and rightist political efforts 
around the globe.  Certainly, in the U.S. the existence of half a million women in the 1920s Klan 
made clear that political projects like those of white supremacy had not been solely the province 
 of men.  Moreover, the Klanswomen of the 1920s were political actors with backgrounds, 
motivations, and actions that did not match those of Klansmen.  For instance, a number of 
prominent leaders of the Women’s Klan came into the Klan after working to promote women’s 
right to vote.  Part of a rightist effort to enlist white women in the electorate to counteract the 
suffrage earlier granted to African American men, they brought to their Klan the political skills 
and networks they had were honed in suffrage activism.  This experience allowed them to 
fashion tactics uniquely tailored for women, tactics that were at least as effective and destructive 
as the traditional night-riding violence of the men’s Klan.  An example was the networks of 
sympathetic women developed by Klanswomen to systematically circulate rumors about their 
enemies.  These “poison squads of whispering women” spread tales of spoiled meat that 
destroyed the livelihoods of Jewish merchants; rumors of sexual attack that drove African 
American men from their homes and communities; and stories of Papal conspiracies used as 
evidence to force Catholic teachers from public school jobs.  
  Focusing on women also reshaped analytic categories used to understand broader aspects 
of far-right politics, what Alice Kessler-Harris described as the way that uncovering the history 
of women can “enrich the study of history tout court.”11   Paying attention to women in the 
1920s Klan, for instance, meant rethinking the idea of collective racial violence.  The racial 
terror practiced by Klanswomen was not public and physical, like that of Klansmen.  Instead, it 
took the form of private rumor mills that could destroy lives and livelihoods.   Exploring the 
propaganda published by the 1920s Women’s Klan also undermined simple ideas about political 
ideologies as either leftist or rightist, as these Women’s Klans embraced rights for (native, white, 
                                                            
11  Alice Kessler-Harris, ‘Do We Still Need Women’s History?’ The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 7 December, 2007, http://chronicle.com/weekely/v54/il5/15b00601.htm. 
 and Protestant) women such as the suffrage and an 8 hour work day for mothers within their 
agenda of racial and religious supremacy.  Taking the Women’s Klan seriously demonstrated 
that important aspects of organized racism had been invisible when only men were taken into 
account; in other words, that organized racism is gendered. 
 The template of German Nazism, too, began to collapse with additional studies of rightist 
movements in the U.S., including those focused on women.   Organized racist movements, for 
instance, did not correlate very well with the nation’s periodic economic crises.  The second 
Klan, the largest wave of organized racism in the twentieth century, grew during the relative 
prosperity of the 1920s and collapsed on the eve of the Great Depression.  Moreover, its strength 
was not only in places characterized by economic, political and social competition and conflict, 
like the tumultuous urban areas where native born whites sought to maintain their stake in jobs 
and housing in the face of vast numbers of new immigrants from Eastern and Southern 
Europeans and African Americans arriving from the rural South or the racially contentious areas 
of the deep South.  Instead, the second Klan flourished as well in the fairly homogeneous small 
towns and rural areas of the Midwest, Northeast, and West.   
 Studies of rightist women in the U.S. also challenged the focus on social dislocation and 
personal frustration as explanations of rightist politics.  They showed instead that the far-right 
could find a base within the fabric of mundane everyday experience in stable and even 
prosperous communities.  Looking carefully at the Women’s Klan of the 1920s, for example, 
revealed how both it and the Men’s Klans established themselves in the framework of ordinary, 
taken-for-granted life of heavily white, native-born Protestant places.  Focusing on women’s 
participation in this Klan revealed the political consequences of the myriad of Klannish rituals 
and events in which women were a profound force, from Klan weddings, funerals, and baby 
 christenings to pie-eating contests, community fairs, junior girls’ Klans, and Klannish father-son 
sporting events.  Far more than incidental cultural activities, these activities and rituals were a 
means by which the Klan could insert its racist agenda directly into the daily life of communities.  
These allowed white native born Protestants to embrace the Klan as just another facet of 
expected life in their racially and religious uniform social world; they did not need the assaults of 
social dislocation or economic frustration to find the Klan’s message compelling.   Such findings 
helped shift the search for the foundations of racist mobilization away from the extraordinary 
forces of social and personal upheaval and toward the ordinary practices of daily life.   
 
   
Current Templates   
 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, three new templates of inquiry emerged within 
scholarship on the U.S. right.  These accommodated study of rightist women’s participation more 
easily than did earlier templates, but they also introduced new assumptions that continue to 
curtail a full understanding of how gender matters in the U.S. political right. 
 
 
Template of historical continuity 
 
 The template of historical continuity emerged as a consequence of a shift toward 
understanding right-wing extremism as a social and political movement rather than an expression 
of collective anxieties and anger.  It developed as part of a general shift away from theorizing all 
social and political movements as irrational outbursts of collective action and toward 
understanding them as strategic, organized, and rational collective responses to perceived 
problems in society.  Scholars continued to emphasize the role of personality factors like 
 authoritarianism, rage, and resentment in shaping movements of the right long after these issues 
ceased to be on the agenda in the study of progressive movements.  Yet, by the mid-1990s, most 
scholarly work on the U.S. right treated it as a social movement that employed rational strategies 
and tactics to mobilize members, develop its goals and ideologies, and change society.12   
 The shift toward considering the right as a political movement proved quite productive 
for scholars.  In the case of modern organized racism, it made it possible to understand why so 
many racist women activists today tend to be well educated and from stable, middle-class 
families – a far cry from the frustrated, dislocated, or marginal members that earlier templates 
would predict.   Looking at organized racism as a racist movement opened questions of what 
strategies racist groups use to cultivate women members and revealed that racist recruiters are 
dispatched to approach women in the ordinary settings of middle-class life – striking up 
conversations on the playground, at meetings of environmental groups, in grocery stores, and in 
birthing preparation classes.  Women join racist groups, not because they initially are filled with 
hate and fury toward racial others, but because they come to know and trust someone who they 
meet in the ordinary course of their lives.  Through these contacts, they slowly learn a set of 
racial beliefs and are eased into the world of organized racism. 
 However, the move toward thinking of the right as a social movement created an analytic 
template that proved problematic in the study of gender and women.  Seeing the right as a social 
movement suggested that it was more coherent and continuous than it might be.  It made rightist 
                                                            
12	  For example, see Chip Berlet and  Matthew Nemiroff Lyons,  Right-Wing Populism in 
America: Too Close for Comfort (New York: Guilford Press, 2000).	  	  
 movements appear to be political entities whose variations across time and context were simply 
instances of an underlying case, obscuring important distinctions within the right. 
The history of the Ku Klux Klan, what Martin Durham terms “America’s distinctive 
contribution to right-wing extremism,”13 suggests the problem with assuming that rightist social 
movements necessarily have analytic integrity.   The KKK had four periods of activity, although 
these were historically discontinuous and had few, if any, overlapping members or organizations.  
In addition to the post-Civil War first Klan and the Klan of the 1920s, a Klan emerged to oppose 
racial desegregation in the 1960s and early 1970s and again, in the form of a myriad of 
competing Klan units, as part of a rise in organized racist activism in the 1980s.  At each 
appearance, the various chapters and groups that claimed the Klan name employed a similar set 
of rituals and dressed their members in comparable regalia, generally white robes and hoods.  
Each Klan also promoted an agenda of white supremacism and, usually, supported violent means 
to achieve its goals.   
Although it is tempting to see these Klans as historical eruptions of an underlying Klan 
movement, there are such significant differences in the Klan across time periods that it is 
difficult to term this a single movement.  Women were members of the 1920s and are members 
in most of the current Klans, but women were excluded from the first Klan and largely absent in 
the third.  Moreover, gender issues do not correspond with women’s Klan participation.   Gender 
was a central ideological issue for the Reconstruction, which portrayed white Southern women as 
under threat from vengeful freed slave men and victorious Union soldiers.  It served a similar 
purpose in the 1920s Men’s Klan which routinely depicted white women as the sexual prey of 
savage African American men, lusting Catholic priests, and exploitative Jewish businessmen.   
                                                            
13   Durham, The Christian Right, p. 4. 
 But gender issues were much more rarely evoked in the nearly all-male 1960s Klan and among 
male leaders in today’s Klans there is considerable division and conflict over whether white 
women are racial victims or equal racist warriors.14 
 The varying approaches of each wave of the Klan to issues of gender and the 
participation of women is true of other issues as well.   African Americans were the primary 
target of the Reconstruction-era and third Klans, but Jews and Catholics were central enemy 
groups in the 1920s.  Today, most Klans target Jews and all people of color.   The 1920s Klan 
was highly nationalistic, terming itself as a 100% American movement.  In the first Klan, 
however, the scars of the Civil War meant that appeals to nationalism were fraught.  The same 
was true of the 1960s Klan which supported an agenda of states’ rights against federal 
government power in the wake of federal support for racial desegregation.  And nationalism is 
increasingly marginal in today’s Klans due to the increasing appeal of the agenda of global pan-
Aryanism.  Put more simply, the ideologies, composition, and focus of the Klan are inconsistent 
over time in ways that defy easy categorization or analysis.  Women aren’t becoming more or 
less central; neither are issues of race or nationalism.    
 The problem with regarding organized racism as a historically continuous movement is 
two-fold.  One issue is methodological: social phenomena that look the same from afar can look 
very different up close.  From an analytic distance, taking what feminist theorist Dorothy Smith 
                                                            
14 Blee, Inside Organized Racism; Betty A. Dobratz and Stephanie Shanks-Meile, ‘The White 
Separatist Movement: Worldviews on Gender, Feminism, Nature and Change’ in Abby L. Ferber 
(ed.), Home-Grown Hate: Gender and Organized Racism (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 
113B42; and Martin Durham, White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics (New 
York: Taylor & Francis, 2007). 
 disparagingly refers to as a “bird’s eye view” of social life15, the Klan seems to be a category of 
racist practice that exists over time – as angry groups of mostly men, garbed in similar outfits, 
eager to blame their problems on racialized others.   From up-close, however, a scrutiny of the 
actual beliefs and practices of each Klan makes it look so different over time, both ideologically 
and organizationally, that it is a stretch to think of it as a single social movement.16   
 The other issue is representational.17  What constitutes an instance – a case18 – of the 
Klan is not self-evident.  Rather, the image of the Klan as a historically (semi)continuous 
movement of white supremacism is deliberately produced by each Klan itself.   At every era 
when the Klan emerges, its leaders position themselves and their group in an historical trajectory, 
as the authentic heirs to a longstanding tradition of white resistance to racial integration and 
                                                            
15  Dorothy Smith, ‘From the 14th Floor to the Sidewalk: Writing Sociology at Ground Level’, 
Sociological Inquiry  78: 3 (2008), pp. 417-422.	  
16 See John R. Hall’s discussion of the problem of concept instability over time and across 
context, in ‘Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical Explanation’, History and 
Theory 39 (October 2000), pp. 331-347.   
17  The complications of political representation are discussed in Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, 
‘Commemorating a Difficult Past: Yitzhak Rabin’s Memorials’, American Sociological Review 
67 (Summer, 2002), pp. 30-51. 
18  Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker	  (eds.), What Is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations 
of Social Inquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).	  
 
 equality.   That is the significance of Stone Mountain, Georgia, the site where each Klan stages 
the rituals that denote the Klan’s re-birth and are intended to impart a sense of the historical 
singularity of the Klan.  Scholars too often represent the Klan as more coherent than it is by 
framing it as a continuous political movement, a category of political life.  Even in a single era, 
however, the Klan isn’t an entity, despite its efforts to represent itself this way, but rather a 
collection of similarly-attired but often only vaguely connected and contending groups. 
 The problem for the study of women and gender on the right is that the template of 
historical continuity can lead to misleading generalizations about how gender matters without 
considering specificities of time, place, and context. 19 The effort to indicate how gender and 
right-wing extremism are related is an example.  Asserting a connection between the ideologies 
or practices of masculine and white supremacism is a highly problematic undertaking if the 
underlying phenomenon of organized racism is not itself a coherent entity.20 
 
 
Template of belief-driven activism  
 
 Another template is that of belief-driven activism.  This is the notion that people come 
into racist movements because they have racist ideas, or, to put it more abstractly, that racist 
                                                            
19  See Barbara Risman, ‘Gender as a Social Structure: Theory Wrestling with Activism’, Gender 
& Society 18:4 (2004), pp. 429-450. 
20 For example, see Michael S. Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its Mal(e)Contents: The Gendered 
Moral and Political Economy of Terrorism,’ International Sociology  18:3 (2003), pp. 603-620 
and Evelyn A. Schlatter, Aryan Cowboys: White Supremacists and the Search for a New 
Frontier, 1970-2000 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006). 
 beliefs cause racist affiliation and action.  But is that always the case?  Consider an example of a 
current racist activist, Sean Gaines.21  Sean was described by one observer as “a skinhead's 
skinhead: 230 pounds of red-laced, jack-booted aggression, recklessness and bravado, notorious 
for flashing his gun one minute at white power gatherings, and his penis the next.”  Raised by a 
drug-addicted father fond of racial epithets, Sean learned to steal cars and cook 
methamphetamine at an early age.  By 16, he and his father were involved in a vicious torture-
murder of a Native American man.  Ten years later, now a committed racist skinhead, Sean’s 
spree of violence and mayhem ended with his arrest for capital murder.  
 At first glance, Sean’s biography fits a stereotyped sense of the path into racial 
extremism: schooled in racist ideas by his father, he turned to violence against racial minorities 
and became a skinhead. Yet, Sean’s story is more complicated.  He had an antipathy toward 
racial minorities, but no particular idea of white supremacy until he hit prison for the first time 
and met a racist skinhead named Odius.  Odius gave Sean the opportunity to earn his first “White 
Pride” tattoo for attacking a prisoner who owed him money and tried – unsuccessfully – to teach 
him the tenets of white power.  By the time he left prison, Sean still knew little about the 
ideology behind the white power movement.  But he was convinced he was a skinhead and 
joined other skinheads on “hunting trips” to attack random minorities.  It was on these trips, 
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 hanging out with skinheads, that Sean finally learned and adopted the ideology of white 
supremacy that fit his commitment to racist action.22   
 Sean’s transition from acting like a racist to thinking like a racist is counter to the usual 
assumption that people develop an ideology and then act on it.  But it is not uncommon.  Many 
racists learn white supremacy by participating in racist actions, not the reverse.  In the U.S. 
today, for example, women racists often learn the virulent ideas of white supremacy as recruiters 
bring them to racist protests, assaults, and violence.  They join in racist activities in the most 
casual manner, with little reflection on ideas behind the action.  Sandy, a skinhead woman I 
interviewed in 2008, told me that she had always liked to fight, that it made her feel alive and 
powerful.   When she met people in a white power skinhead group, Sandy recalled being 
instantly attracted to their aggressiveness, the way they talked of smashing their enemies.  She 
joined them in street fights and in violent initiations of new members and soon became a regular.  
Only after fighting alongside them for some time did she learn and come to embrace their neo-
Nazi beliefs.   
 Sean and Sandy’s stories do not match the general assumption that people join racist 
groups because they hate racial minorities.  In their cases, actions came first; only later did they 
learn and adopt the ideologies that then confirmed their racially extreme actions.  They were not 
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 in racist groups to express their racist ideas.  Rather, being in racist groups transformed their 
ideas.  They were exposed to racist ideologies in the context of racist actions.  In modern 
organized racism, recruits generally enter racist groups with racist beliefs about African 
Americans, often not all that different than those of other whites.  As they become an active part 
of a racist group, their ideas are reshaped.  They learn a new kind of racism, in which Jewish 
conspirators are said to manipulate whites and people of color for their own benefit and in which 
the only true whites are those loyal to the white race.  That is, racist groups create a form of 
racism quite different than the ordinary racism with which its followers begin.   
 By obscuring the possibility that action can shape belief, the template of belief-driven 
activism misses one way that groups matter in organized racism – shaping the ideas as well as 
the passion of members.  It also can obscure how gender can matter.  Since most racist groups 
are highly structured by gender (even though today’s Klans are gender-integrated, their official 
leaders and spokespersons are virtually all men), racist recruits learn white supremacism within a 
gendered context.  For instance, the slogan of today’s white supremacism, known as the “14 
words” (“We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children") is taught 
to women and men very differently.  Men learn the slogan as a mandate for individual racial 
heroism in which the rules of gender are clear: masculinity is demonstrated through racial 
violence and commitment.  Women learn the slogan as a defensive posture, one in which the 
rules of gender are suspended: women are called to racial actions that are otherwise 
unimaginable for them for reasons that are extraordinary.  Racist activism for women is the 
upside-down carnival of possibility; for men, it is the culmination of established notions of white 
manhood. 
 
 Template of gender as a category of analysis 
  The final template is that gender always matters.  This is evident in the assumption that 
the motives that bring women and men into racist activism will necessarily differ.   Consider the 
case of 22-year-old Tristian Lynn Frye who was arrested for her part in a 2003 attack and murder 
of a homeless man in Tacoma, Washington.  The attack was carried out by Tristian and three 
men, among them her boyfriend, with whose child she was pregnant, and the 19-year-old male 
reputed leader of the local neo-Nazi Volksfront. The four, all known racist skinheads, had set out 
to assault a Black drug dealer, but instead attacked a man suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.  
Despite Tristian’s statement that she was motivated by a desire to earn a pair of red shoelaces, a 
Nazi symbol of having taken part in violence against a minority person, and her admission to 
kicking the homeless man in the head, hard, three or four times, prosecutors considered her to be 
under the influence of her two male comrades and recommended a reduced sentence.23 
 The logic of scholarly inquiry can be not all that different from what happens in the legal 
system.  Women’s participation in the right is often firstly attributed to private, affective, and 
domestic concerns, swamping other possibilities.  When women become active racists, in a 
common explanatory narrative, they extend their private concerns (for children, family) into the 
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 public.  They stretch their maternalism or personal loyalties into broader efforts to protect 
intimate life writ large, on behalf of the white race or the Aryan nation.   
 The problem is not only that this is a narrow analytic lens on women’s racial activism.  
Nor that it rests on a public/private dichotomy that legions of feminist historians have worked to 
undermine.  The problem is that by assuming that gender (in this case, a gendered division of 
public and private) is uniformly important, it undercuts our ability to see how gender can be 
more or less – or differently – salient across social arenas and in relation to other forms of 
categorization.24 
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  Michael Schwartz observed that we can sometimes see social phenomena more clearly if 
we look at them indirectly.25  Perhaps this is true as well for gender.   Might it be difficult to see 
how racism is gendered when we are looking for it, when we expect to find it in most 
movements in most historical and spatial settings, when we assume its importance?  Are we most 
comfortable, as Jane Atkinson noted, when gender ‘fairly screams out’ for comment and less 
clear what to do when gender is less salient?26 
 Studies that look for gender in racist movements are easily caught up by the hyper-
masculinist character of such movements.  They are rife with bravado, guns, threats, 
definitiveness, the belittling of others, strength, boasts, swagger, and the embrace of social 
hierarchy.    Yet there are other dynamics in these groups that are difficult to categorize as 
masculine: intrigue, gossip, treachery, drama, artifice, the centrality of bonds among members, 
performance, and perhaps most centrally, fear and anxiety.   Does that mean that masculinity is 
irrelevant in racist movements?  Assuredly not.  But it does suggest that gender can be more 
complex in racist movements than we might see if we simply assume that gender matters.  The 
ways that some racist groups represent themselves, and even their self-identity, is hyper-
masculinized: racists are manly men, virile warriors, able to fight off enemies and usher in a 
white supremacist paradise.   But, like the Klan’s historical continuity, the masculinist nature of 
organized racism can be a staged representation that obscures more interesting gendered 
dynamics.   
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  In the 1920s, for example, white women were brought into the Klan as newly-
enfranchised voters.  Today, racist groups also recruit women.  But in both cases, that they were 
women was somewhat beside the point.  In the 1920s, white women were newly-enfranchised, 
thus tempting bait for a Klan hungry for votes for its electoral efforts and dues money for its 
financial empire.  Today, women are targeted for recruitment at least in part because male racist 
leaders view women as less likely to have criminal records and therefore less vulnerable to 
becoming informants for, or targets of, the police.   In both times, women were brought into 
organized racism for somewhat non-gendered reasons.  
 By assuming a priori that gender matters in organized racism, it can be difficult to see the 
intriguing ways in which it does.  Put another way, we may need to rethink the move from 
asserting that gender matters in organized racism to assuming that gender matters similarly 
across time and contexts and thereby can be a starting point of analysis.  How gender matters in 
organized racism requires not only that we see gender, but also that we see its limits, its cracks, 
and its fissures.  To know when gender matters requires us to know when it does not.27   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 How can we move ahead to understand gender on the political right?  Certainly, it is not 
possible to operate without templates.  They are the sea in which scholars swim, difficult to 
perceive or move beyond.  But we can push against the constraints of current templates of the 
U.S. right by asking more specific questions about how and to what extent gender matters on the 
                                                            
27  This is part of the project of historicizing gender, elaborated in Joanne Meyerowitz, ‘A History 
of ‘Gender’’, American Historical Review 113:5 (2008), pp. 1346-1356. 
 right.  Four questions are likely to be particularly productive in the next stages of studies of 
gender in rightist movements in the U.S. 
First, when is gender most salient, meaningful, and effectual in collective rightist projects 
and when is it less so?28  It is no longer sufficient to show that the U.S. far-right is gendered.  
Scholars now need to establish the differing levels at which gender matters and how it does so.  
Might gender be more salient in rightist movements that arise during periods of broader social 
contention over issues of gender, such as during the women’s suffrage struggle or the feminist 
movement of the 1970s, than at other times?  To what extent do rightist movements create new 
meanings for how gender is deployed in political efforts or rely on existing social understandings 
of gender and politics? To what extent are gender issues important in the success or failure of 
rightist movements?  
Second, to whom does gender matter in the far right?  Scholars of the right should pay 
more attention to the audiences for rightist movements.29  They can include external audiences 
like prospective recruits, enemy groups, passive observers, and the media.  As well, rightist 
movements have internal audiences such as competing rightist leaders, rank-and-file members, 
and even disgruntled members.  It may be useful to distinguish the audiences to which rightist 
movements direct messages of gender, as well as to consider whether (in under what 
circumstances) far-right movements craft multiple, even competing messages for different 
audiences.   
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 Third, what does gender matter for?   In addition to establishing that the far-right is 
gendered, scholars might explore the work that gender does in rightist movements.  Do highly 
gendered ideological frames or practices serve to recruit women or maintain male supremacism 
in rightist groups?  Are they used as tactics or as long-term strategies, and toward what goals?  
Are rightist groups and movement self-conscious about their use of gender?  Do they have 
internal conflicts over gender? 
Finally, what is the mechanism by which gender matters, or does not?30  Rightist 
movements differ in the process whereby they are gendered.   Scholars may be able to tease out 
the specific dynamics of gender on the right by paying close attention to when rightist projects 
evoke gender, when they depend on gendered ideas and interpersonal relations, and when they 
might even erode existing ideas and arrangements of gender.   
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